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ASS  TDACT 
The  purpose of this study is to identify conditions  under  which 
renewed  international lending  will benefit  both the developed  and the 
developing  countries.  Our analysis will evaluate how the presence  of 
terms  of trade  adjustient  and distorted  credit  markets  affect  the 
conditions  for the existence  of beneficial  lending.  We demonstrate 
that  in the presence  of endogenous  terms of trade adjustment,  there 
are cases in which  a competitive  international banking  systen  nay not 
revitalize  lending for investment purposes,  even  if such renewed 
lending  is socially  desirable  Renewed  lending nay require  the 
appropriate  conditionality,  and  the presence  of endogenous  terms of 
trade adjustment  puts greater  weight  on investment conditionality. 
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Israe. I.  Introduction 
The international  capital market  is presently  characterized by 
effective credit  rationing to developing  countries.  Most developing 
countries  cannot obtain new credits from the international banking 
system.  This situation  is in sharp contrast with  the 1970's, when  the 
international  banking system engaged  willingly  in substantial  resource 
transfer  to the developing countries.  This remarkable  switch from a 
functioning international  credit market  to a market characterized  by 
credit rationing reflects the growing  awareness of the country risk 
involved in further lending to developing countries.  Most  developing 
countries  have reached a point  where  their willingness  or ability  to 
service their debt is questionable,  thereby increasing the reluctance 
of the international banking  system to extend new credits.  This 
situation  is further  complicated by the drop in export prices 
experienced  by the developing nations  in recent  years, a process that 
has further reduced their ability and willingness to service their 
debt. 
A  significant  literature has evolved in recent years  which 
attempts  to study  the unique characteristics  of international  country 
risk.  The lack of simple enforcement mechanisms  for international 
debt repayment tends to degenerate the international  credit market 
into an equilibrium where  the volume of international  credit is 
limited by the effective  penalties  associated with  defaults.  These 
penalties  are potential embargoes  that would restrict  the flow of both 
temporal  and intertemporal trade (i.e., trade in goods  and financial 
assets, respectively) While  the above  literature has provided clues regarding the 
problems  of country risk, it has raised important policy  questions of 
what  can be (Or should be)  done in the present situation characterized 
by "over—borrowing"  and debt  overhang.2 An open question  is the 
degree to which the international  system will be capable of 
revitalizing the resource transfer  for investment purposes  from the 
developed to the developing nations. 
The purpose of this  paper is to identify conditions under  which 
renewed lending may benefit both  the  developed  and the developing 
countries.  We evaluate how the  presence  of endogenous terms  of trade 
effects--that  is, a situation in which terms of trade  between  debtor 
and creditor nations are significantly  affected by the financial  flows 
between  them——affects the conditions for the existence of beneficial 
lending.  This analysis has special relevance because  a competitive 
international banking  system  does not internalize terms of trade 
effects,  and may not revitalize lending for investment purposes,  even 
in situations in which renewed  lending is socially desirable.  This 
may suggest an important  role for policy-makers  in imposing the 
appropriate conditionality  (i.e.,  by imposing guidelines  regarding  the 
domestic policies that  should follow renewed lending).  We  will 
attempt to evaluate conditions under  which  such a role is desirable. 
We start our  analysis  by reviewing  the  behavior  of the  terms  of 
trade of developing  nations in recent years.  The relevance  of terms 
of trade effects for the debt situation  depends  mainly  on the 
existence of a less than perfectly elastic demand for developing 
countries'  exports.  Existing  econometric studies conclude  that 
developing  countries  face a  downward—sloping  demand curve for their 
exports,  at least when  taken  as a group.  In addition, the sharp 
2 deterioration  in terms  of trade of debtor  countries  since the start  of 
the debt crisis, and the recent behavior  of commodity prices suggest 
the existence  of a strong connection between  terms  of trade changes 
and the debt  situation. 
We continue our analysis by describing a model of the 
international credit  market  which  is characterized by insolvency on 
the  part  of debtor countries.  This means  that repayments do  not 
suffice to cover  all obligations, and therefore  become nore closely 
related to available  resources in the debtor  economy than to existing 
debt.  As a consequence, the debtor countries  cannot borrow as much  as 
they would like to3, and find themselves  credit rationed.  In these 
circumstances,  we assume that debtors and  creditors  negotiate 
'contracts' that offer increased lending based  on some conditions on 
the use of the resources agreed to by  the debtor country, and on the 
extent of the attachment of the debtors output to repayment.  This 
simple framework  is intended to capture some of the main features of 
the current rescheduling negotiation process. 
The debt negotiations  are assumed to take place  in the context of 
a two—period, two—good  world  economy composed of two blocks of 
nations:  creditors  and debtors.  Each block  produces one good, and 
consumes both.  In the first period, debtors  and creditors try to 
reach a deal, or contract, to increase lending.  The contracts  are 
defined as a  resource transfer  to the developing  nations in the first 
period  that specifies a marginal propensity  to invest out of the 
transfer and a marginal  propensity to repay  out of the proceeds  of the 
new investment  in the second period.  A  contract  is a 
'Pareto—improving contract'  if both blocks of nations  benefit from the 
marginal  resource  transfers.  We obtain the conditions  for the existence of Pareto contracts, and  describe them. 
In the absence  of terms of trade effects  (perfect 
substitutability  between  the two goods) the key results can be 
summarized  in the following way.  The conditiofl  guaranteeing  the 
existence of Pareto contracts  is that the marginal productivity  of 
capital in the  developing  countries should exceed that  in the 
developed countries.  In the absence cf iistortions  (other than  the 
international credit  market insolvency situation) this condition  is 
identical to the requirement that the interest rate be higher  in the 
developing than  in the developed nations.  The larger the excess of 
the marginal productivity  of capital in the developed  countries,  the 
larger the range  of Pareto contracts,  The presumption  is that this 
condition  is indeed satisfied because the interest rate in the  heavily 
indebted countries  tends to be higher than in the. industrial 
countries.  Nevertheless,  in a real world situation,  the marginal 
resource transfer  will  not occur in the absence  of either appropriate 
incentives or  conditionality  on the debtor country. 
We turn then  to the analysis of the consequences  of endogenous 
terms of  trade  adjustment due  to limited  goods  substitutability  on the 
region of Pareto contracts.  We  show  that  the Pareto region  is 
enlarged  for strict conditionality  contracts  (contracts that require 
high marginal propensity  to invest in the  debtor  country) and is 
reduced for contracts  requiring  low marginal propensity  to invest on 
the part of the debtor country.  We also analyze an alternative  type 
of contract between  debtors and  creditors.  In this case  the amount of 
the repayment  is the only  variable  to be agreed upon, and investment 
is assumed to  be undertaken  in an optimal manner  by the developing 
country.  We show how, in this framework, the existence  of endogenous 
4 terms of trade  modifies  the region of Pareto—improving  contracts. 
It is noteworthy  that the terms of trade  effect is not 
internalized by the international  banking system.  This  has the 
consequence that  in the negotiation process the interests of the 
banking system  may diverge from those of a  representative  consumer  in 
the creditor  country.  Tlis possibility may suggest an important role 
in the debt  renegotiation  process for governmental  institutions that 
may provide  the international banking system  with  the proper 
incentives needed  to implement the desirable contracts. 
II.  The Empirical  Relevance of Terms of Trade  Effects 
The relevance of terms of trade effects for the debt situation 
depends on the answer  to the following question: do debtor  countries 
face a downward—sloping  demand curve for their export products?  There 
are two reasons to believe  that they do.  The first is that although 
perhaps all debtor  countries can be considered small economies,  often 
they are all simultaneously  affected by the same shocks, and their 
joint response  is of a large magnitude.  For example,  the increasing 
unavailability  of foreign borrowing  since 1982 affected most debtor 
countries; their response  included a generalized  increase  in exports, 
and a terms of trade deterioration  followed.4  This  means  that even 
if the actions of each  individual debtor country cannot  affect its 
terms of trade, on occasions the debtor country may find falling 
prices  every time it tries to increase the volume  of its exports 
because  other debtor  countries are doing  the same. The second  reason is that an increasing portion  of debtor 
countries' exports are manufactured products, the markets for which 
are, in many  cases, well described by a differentiated  products 
structure,  In a  differentiated—products  framework  (such as Spence 
(l976)) there is a whole continuum of goods that can be produced by 
a given  industry, each  of them differing only slightly  from the point 
of view  of consumers'  preferences.  Wit) increasing returns, each  firm 
will specialize  in a  different  product on the continuum, and it will 
command a certain degree of market power6 If this is the case, the 
manufactured  exports from debtor countries will face a 
downward—sloping  demand curve, irrespective of size considerations. 
Econometric studies  of the elasticity cf demand for developing 
country exports by industrial economies have  usually  taken  developing 
countries as a  group.  Estimates of this import demand  elasticity 
range from somewhat less than 1 to over 4,7  The  studies use, 
however, different  aggregations for the definition  of the import 
commodity, and different  aggregations for the importer economy,  apart 
from different  sample periods.  Despite that  fact, it appears that a 
number slightly  above 1 is a reasonable synthesis of econometric 
estimates of import demand elaSticity.  It is interesting to note that 
the median  (across products)  elasticity estimated  by Grossman  (1982) 
is equal to 1.2, the median (across countries) elasticity  estimated  by 
Marquez and McNeilly  (1987) is also equal to 1.2, and  the elasticity 
estimated by Dornbusch  (1985) for the aggregate  of non—oil developing 
countries  is also equal to l.2.  Such a figure is also in line with 
estimates  of import price  elasticities for industrial goods 
irrespective of the country  of origin of exports (see Goldstein  and 
Khan (1985)).  This elasticity  applies, however,  to the aggregate  of 
6 developing  country exports,  although for some particular  goods, a few 
exporters  account for most of the supply. 
In fact, the evolution  of the terms of trade of the  group  of 
fifteen heavily  indebted  countries  appears to reflect quite strongly 
the debt problems  faced by them since 1982, as suggested by the data 
displayed  in Table  1.  Sin'e  1982, the combined non-interest  current 
account for this group of  countries  displays a sharp turnaround.  The 
non—interest current  account, that averaged a deficit of over  $2 
billion in the  period  1968—81, moved to an average surplus of over $32 
billion during  1982-87.  This turnaround reflects  the loss of access 
to international credit  from private sources of many  debtor countries. 
At the same time, these fifteen debtor  countries  experienced a sharp 
deterioration  in terms  of trade, a cumulative 22 percent  relative to 
1981 levels.  Despite that deterioration,  the volume  of exports showed 
a cumulative  increase of over 10 percent in the same period. 
In addition to the  general picture portrayed by Table  1, there 
are other pieces of evidence that indicate an interaction between the 
foreign debt  situation  and terms of trade developments.  One of these 
is the behavior  of the prices of non-oil commodities produced  by 
developing  countries.  Despite continuous economic  expansion  in 
industrial countries the relative price  of non—oil commodities  fell 
sharply since  1983.  Econometric studies have often found that non—oil 
commodity  prices  can be  explained  well by business cycle developments 
in industrial countries and the dollar exchange rate  (see Dornbusch 
(1985)).  However,  since 1983, there appears to be break  in 
traditional  relationships,  (Morrison and Wattleworth,  (1987)>.  Chart 
1, that plots  an index  of industrial production and  the relative price 
of non—oil commodities  since 1975, also  suggests the existence  of such 
7 break  in the relationship between these two variables, 
An additional  piece of evidence concerns the differentiated 
products argument.  A large part of the increase in debtor countries' 
exports since 1982 consisted of manufactures, among  which  there are a 
number of goods  which can easily fit the differentiated  products 
description.  Although  disaggregated  data on price and quantity 
indices of industrial exports are hard to obtain, there exists 
published  information in the case of Chile.  These data do show large 
increases  in the volume of industrial exports accompanied by sharp 
drops in prices, as displayed  in Table 2.  Since 1982, the volume  of 
manufactured  exports  grew by a cumulative 76 percent.  However, this 
growth required  deep cuts in prices, and the dollar  prices of 
manufactured  exports  fell by a cumulative 36 percent.  Relative to the 
prices  of manufactures  exported by industrial countries,  the fall in 
export prices is even larger.  Relative to the  unit  value index of 
their own imports, however, the decrease is smaller, which is partly 
explained by the decrease  in commodity prices and in prices of exports 
originated  in other developing countries.  In addition, we conjecture 
that there might  be a quality  effect hidden in the data,  As imports 
became more expensive  and real income adjusted downwards,  there might 
have been a switch towards lower quality products  in imports.  This 
interpretation  is suggested by a  disaggregation  of import price data, 
which  shows a  very  sharp decrease in the prices  of consumption good 
imports, and only  a slight decrease in the prices  of capital good 
imports. 
8 III.  A  Framework of Analysis 
The purpose  of our analysis  is to identify conditions under  which 
an increase in the resource transfer  from developed  to developing 
countries would  be beneficial, and to study the consequences  of 
eridogenous  terms of trade adjustment.  The simplest  framework  to  deal 
with  these issues is a two-period, two—good world economy  composed  of 
two blocks of nations:  developed and developing nations.  Each  block 
produces  one good, and consumes both.  For simplicity  of exposition  it 
is convenient to assume  that in the long-run the relative  price  of the 
two goods  is exogenously  fixed by the technology of production.  In 
the short-run the supply is given, and the relative price of the two 
goods is determined  by the prevailing  demand  conditions.  We  will 
identify the  short  run with the first period, and the long run with 
the second. 
On the supply side, let X and Y denote the good  produced  by the 
developed  and the developing  nations, respectively.  Let  and 
denote  the output level of the two goods in period i, i=l,2.  The 
output  level is exogenously given  in period one.  In the second 
period, the output level is determined  by investment carried out in 
period one, which  is denoted  by I.  We assume an asymmetric 
environment: good X can be either  consumed or invested to increase the 
future output of both good X and  Y, while good Y can only  be used for 
consumption purposes.  The investment technologies also  differ.  In 
the developed economy,  second—period  output is linked to investment 
according to: 
—  (l+r) dl 
9 where  I refers to investment in the production  of good X by  the 
developed  economy, and r is the interest rate in the developed 
country.  Thus, optimality conditions ensure that  the marginal  product 
of capital is always equal to the interest rate in the developed 
economy.  The supply level of a good is indicated by a bar over its 
name.  In the debtor  economy,  investment translates  into output 
according to: 
dY2  m(I) dI* 
* 
where I  refers  to the use of good X  for investment purposes  in the 
developing  country, and  m  is a function of the volume  of investment, 
displaying  decreasing  returns.  We do not make the assumption  that the 
marginal product  of capital equals the interest rate in the  developing 
economy.  Instead, the  volume  of investment is determined by an 
economic  authority, and it is the subject of bargaining between  debtor 
and creditor.  Specifically, we assume that a fraction  is invested 
out of every extra  dollar  of net borrowing: 
-  (1) 
and that  the value of  is subject to debt negotiations.  In fact, the 
actual subject of the debt negotiations could  be an economic policy 
package for the debtor  economy, which  contains  a set of measures  (say 
taxes and subsidies> that ensure that the level of investment in the 
economy is consistent with the given value  of 5. 
10 Note that  the domestic interest  rate in the debtor  country  (Which 
we will denote  by r*)  will not  be equal to the interest rate in  the 
creditor country,  r.  This is a  consequence of the situation  of 
insolvency which we assume the debtor country  to be in.  This 
situation implies that, in period  one, the debtor  country can obtain 
net foreign resources only  up to a certain  limit B, which it cannot 
control.  Thus, if this  is a binding constraint, the debtor country  is 
credit—rationed,  and r* will exceed r. 
The situation  of insolvency also implies that repayments by the 
debtor country  will fall short of its obligations and will thus be 
linked the debtor's capacity to pay.  Specifically, we assume  that, in 
period  two, the debtor country repays an amount R  which  is linked to 
its available resources by: 
dR  —  -  x  (2) 
dY2 
The value of x is determined  by negotiations between the debtor 
country and its creditors.  We assume that  there exists previous 
indebtedness,  contracted before  period  one, of a level that is larger 
than  any value  that R can attain.  Note  that this also implies that R 
can  be larger or smaller than (1+r)B.  In the absence of credit 
rationing  and insolvency,  interest rates would  be equalized,  and 
repayment would  equal total existing  debt (plus the corresponding 
interest). 
Let P  denote  the price of good  z in period i, where  z  X,Y, 
and i = 1,2;  and by  =  1  ) the relative price  in period  i. 
It is convenient  to use good X as the nuineraire,  normalizing  1 to 
11. one.  We will assume that the future relative price of the two goods 
is constant,  say  = 1.  The motivation  is basically to 
concentrate on  the terms of trade  effects in the first period, when 
the flow  of international  resources  is from the developed country  to 
the developing  country.  The budget  constraints  faced by the 
developing  country  are: 
*  * 
*  *  x2 +  *  Y2  R 
xi 
+  +  *  QY1  + B  I  +  *  (3 
l+r  j+r 
+ 
QY1  QY1 
+ B  1*  (4j 
where all variables are defined  in terms of good X, B stands for 
net borrowing  by the developing  nations from the developed  nations in 
period  one, R stands for the flows of payments  in the second  period 
* 
from the developing to  the developed nation, and r  is the domestic 
interest rate in the debtor economy.  Stars identify a variable  as 
corresponding to  the  debtor  country.  Q is used  as shorthand  for 
Equation  (3) is the standard  lifetime budget  constraint faced  by the 
representative  agent in the debtor  country.  In addition, the credit 
constraint puts a separate  restriction on the  debtor  country  in period 
one, namely  that the debtor  country  cannot borrow beyond  the exogenous 
limit  B.  This restriction  is represented by equation  (4). 
Similarly,  the budget  constraints  faced by the developed  economy 
are: 
12 X  +Y  X  +R 
X1+QY1+ 
2  2  —  2 
(5) 
l+r  l+r 
X1÷QY1 
—  (6) 
1.  Debt Negotiations 
In this sub—section, we  will  discuss the existence  of contracts 
that  could  make  an increase in lending  attractive  to both debtors  and 
creditors.  We assume that negotiations may take  place  over the  value 
of two parameters:  and x  that  is, over the proportion  of new 
lending that is devoted to investment and  over  the proportion  of the 
increase  in debtor  country's GDP that will be paid back to creditors. 
We  will identify values  of  and x for which both the debtor and the 
creditor countries  will find it worthwhile to engage  in increased 
lending.  In the presence of risk  of debt  repudiation, there are 
reasons to  believe  that the optimal contract may not be implemented  by 
a competitive banking  system.  Consequently,  it may be useful to 
identify conditions  under which policy actions can lead to such 
contracts. 
Let us assume  that utility functions of the representative 
consumer  in the developing and the developed  countries  are given  by: 
*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * 
U 
(X1,Y1,X2,Y2) 
—  u (X1Y1) 
+  pu  (X2,Y2)  (7) 
U(X1,Y1,X2,Y2) 
— 
u(X1,Y1)  ÷ 
pu(X2Y2)  (8) 
13 We can obtain the  welfare  effects on the creditor  and debtor 
economies derived from increased lending by differentiating  (7) and 
(8),  and making  use of the standard  optinality conditions  on the 
marginal  rates of substitution,  and of the budget constraints  (the 
detailed  derivation  is presented  in the Appendix): 
-  -  +  +  f(l-)m  (9) 
dE  dB  l+r 
The first term in (9) measures  the welfare consequences  of the 
change  in the terms of  trade, given by the volume  of exports  (Y1 = 
— 1) times the improvement in the terms of trade.  The other  terms 
reflect  the increase  in consumption.  Consumption goes up in period 
one by 1—a, and in period  two by m(l-x).  The second-period  increase 
in consumption  stems from an increase in output equal to m, with  a 
fraction x of that increase being  paid back to the developed 
countries. 
The same procedure  applied  to  the developed economy leads to: 
—  —  -  1  + —4--  (10) 
dE  'l,X  dB  +r 
Equation  (10)  shows that welfare  in the developed countries 
changes in proportion to the amount of imports due to the terms  of 
trade  effect, decreases  due to the direct drop in wealth  resultant 
from  the transfer, and increases due to the increase in repayment  from 
the developing  nation in the second period. 
14 2.  The  Existence  of Pareto—Improving  Contracts 
The international  capital market setup is one in which  the  debtor 
country cannot  service its obligations  in full (or cannot be forced 
to>.  Its creditors  nay nevertheless be  willing  to provide additional 
resources, perhaps  as a defensive strategy  for previously  contracted 
loans (Krugman  (1987)).  In this context, we assume that debtors  and 
creditors  bargain  over the conditionality  attached  to any additional 
lending.  This  conditionality  is summarized by  the two parameters  (fi 
10  and x) that  determine  investment and repayment. 
We will now  try to identify the range of values  of the parameters 
x arid  for which  both  blocks of nations could benefit  from increased 
resource transfers  to  the developing nations.  We will  call this 
region the region of Pareto—improving  contracts.  A  region of 
Pareto—improving  contracts will exist if additional  lending increases 
the world's  total welfare.  We can compute the global change in world 
welfare generated  by an increase in international  lending by adding up 
the welfare  changes in each block, equations  (17)  and  (18): 
- r 
*  +  — 
iJ  (11) 
(l+r)(1+r )  1+r 
The first term measures the consequences of shifting resources 
from developed  to developing nations.  It is proportional to the 
interest rate differential,  and to the marginal  investment rate in the 
developing nations  (a).  This corresponds to the fact that resources 
are being  transfered  from a low to a  high  interest rate country, where 
more  productive  investment projects  exist.  The second term measures 
the potential  distortion  in the capital markets of the developing 
15 nations.  In the absence of distortions——other  than the international 
credit market situation——this  term is zero, because investors will 
equate the marginal product  of capital  (m) to the interest rate 
(l+r*)  In the  presence  of distortions, the term  in brackets  is a 
measure  of the distortion  wedge, and the change in welfare  is 
proportional  to the distortion  times the change  in  the distorted 
activity  (fi)  Note that  the overall change in world welfare  is 
proportional to the  marginal  investment rate in the developing 
country.  If no new investment is triggered by the transfer  there  are 
no aggregate wealth  changes. 
We start our analysis considering the limiting case  in which the 
two goods are perfect  substitutes  (dQ/dB = 0),  and we will later 
evaluate the consequences  of imperfect substitutability  on the region 
of Pareto contracts. 
3.  Pareto-Improving  Contracts with Perfect Substitutability 
To obtain  the region of Pareto—improving contracts  we start by 
tracing  an indifference curve on  the  ($,x) plane.  This  curve is the 
locus  of the pairs of  values  of  and  for which  the  country  is 
indifferent with respect to (marginal) additional  lending.  The curve 
forms the boundary of the region where  the country  benefits  from a 
marginal  increase  in the resource transfer.  Applying  the same 
procedure  to the two countries allows us to identify the conditions 
under  which the region of (x,8) where both  countries  will benefit  from 
resource transfer  is not empty. 
The configurations  of  and fi  for which  the developing  nations 
16 are indifferent with  respect to increasing credit in the margin  are 
obtained  from (9): 
— 
I  (1-x)  (12) 
l+r 
Equation  (12)  defines  he curve DD in Figure  1.  In Figure 1, a 
point like H  corresponds  to a contract  that  increases  the credit 
available to the developing countries under the conditions that a 
fraction  of the marginal credit is devoted  to investment and that a 
fraction xH of the increase  in future output is paid  to the developed 
countries.  All points  to the southwest of DD form the region for 
which  the developing  countries benefit from an increase  in the 
resource transfer.12  Therefore, as long as 0 < x,,8 ￿ 1,  the 
developing  countries benefit for all possible contracts.3 
The  parallel  condition  for developed  countries  is given  by: 
—  (13) 
This condition  defines curve CC (Figure 1),  drawn  for the case in 
which the marginal  productivity of investment  in the  developing 
nations exceeds the interest rate in the developed  nations.  All 
points to the northeast  of CC form the region  for which the developed 
countries will benefit  from an increase in resource  transfer.  The 
interpretation  of  (13)  is straightforward.  An increase in lending in 
period one of one dollar  generates  an increase  in payoff in period  two 
of mx.  That implicit rate of return  is compared to  the  domestic  rate 
r to determine  the convenience  of increasing lending. 
17 The area between  the two curves in Figure 1 defines  the Pareto 
contracts.  The condition  that guarantees the existence of 
Paretoimproving contracts  is that the marginal productivity  of 
capital in the  developing  countries exceeds that in the developed 
countries.  The  greater  is the excess of the  marginal  productivity  of 
capital, the greater  is the area of Pareto contracts. 
There  is a strong  presumption that  this  condition  for the 
existence of Paretoimproving contracts is indeed satisfied  in the 
real world, because interest rates in heaviiyindebted countries  tend 
to be  much  higher than  in creditor countries, and presumably  the 
divergence of the marginal product of capital with  respect to the 
interest rate is not so large,  However, also  in a real world 
situation, the marginal  resource transfer will  not occur in the 
absence of proper incentives or of conditionality  on the debtor 
country to satisfy the terms (,x) of the contract. 
4.  Pareto-Improving  Contracts  with  Imperfect  Substitutability 
Under  limited  goods  substitutability,  an increase  in the resource 
transfer will have  some impact on terms of trade.  In the next 
section, we develop a model  that determines the terms  of trade effect 
explicitely.  In the  meantime,  an approximate analysis  can be made 
using  only  information on the sign of  dQ/dB.14 
From (9) and (10)  we obtain  the new  boundaries  of  the sets of 
contracts that are advantageous to the debtor  and the creditor 
country, respectively: 
18 1 + 
—  (14) 
m(l-X)  1  * 
1+r 
I + Y1——  —  (15) 
1+r 
Consider  first the case in which  -l < dQ/dB  < 0.  Both the  CC and 
DD curves shift towards the origin.  The set of contracts  for which 
developing  countries are willing to receive  additional resources  is in 
fact smaller.  Some contracts  in the upper-left  part of the unit 
square are no longer beneficial because  the  welfare  effect of the 
terms of trade  deterioration  offsets the additional  consumption 
possibilities generated  by the increased lending.  In contrast,  the 
set of contracts  for which  developed nations are willing  to increase 
lending is now larger, because  the existence of a relative  price 
effect is favorable to  the  developed countries. 
We conclude  that a deterioration  in the terms of trade of 
developing  countries has the consequence of shifting the location of 
the Pareto  region leftwards and downwards.  This means that the 
developed  countries  may obtain  "softer conditionality  terms, because 
part of the economic  repayment is implemented via terms  of trade 
adjustment.  This effect  would  be larger the lower  is the 
substitutability  between the two goods.  It is noteworthy  that from 
the point  of view  of the banking system  the curve  CC continues to  be 
the relevant  contract  indifference curve.  This has the potential 
consequence  that at  the  negotiation process  the interests of the 
banking  system may  diverge  from those of the other  parties.  There 
19 exist some contracts  that are Pareto-improving but are associated with 
losses to the banking  system.  This possibility suggests  an important 
role in the process  for policy actions to provide international  banks 
with  the proper incentives needed to implement such contracts. 
Consider  now the case  of dQ/dB positive.  Both the CC and PD 
curves will shift outwards.  The developing  countries will now be 
willing  to accept some  contracts that  produce  a negative  payoff  when 
evaluated  at the domestic  interest rate, because  the terms of trade 
improvement more  than compensate  for that,  From the point  of view  of 
creditor  countries,  however, the set of beneficial  contracts  is now 
smaller,  This  would  be  a  situation in which the creditor  country 
would attempt  to regulate banks in order  to restrain them  from 
increasing  lending under some contracts that generate  profits for the 
banks but make  the creditor  country worse of  f. 
Consequently, the impact of endogenous terms of trade is 
determined  by  the direction of the terms of trade  adjustment to the 
marginal  increase in credit.  We now turn to study the factors 
determining the sign of dQ/dB. 
5.  A Model Linking Terms of Trade to International Lending 
The framework of lending and investment is as described  above, 
and  the budget constraints  (3) to (6) apply.  We assume that  the 
demand  structure  in the developed nation can be summarized  byJ5 
20 X1 
— 
Eg(Q);  '1  E1(l.g(Q))  (16) 
— 
E2g(l);  Y2 
—  E2(l-g(1))  (17) 
E2 
—  p(l+r)E1  (18) 
where  is total expenditure  in period  i (E  = X+ Q1Y).  The 
function g(Q) determines  the distribution of expenditure between  the 
two goods as a function of Lhe relative price. 
The demand functions for the developing world  are entirely 
symmetrical.  However, we assume that each country may consume a 
larger proportion of the domestically produced good.  This  can be 
represented  by: 
— 
Eag(Q);  QYj 
— 
E(1-ag(Q))  (19) 
E2ag(1);  Y2 
—  E2(1-ag(1))  (20) 
E2  p(1+r*)E  (21) 
where a < 1.  The  parameter  a measures the domestic bias  in 
consumption.16  To simplify  further, it is useful to consider  the 
special case  in which the g functions are given  by:17 
g(Q) 
—  hQa  h  < 1  (22) 
Therefore,  a is equal to the  elasticity of demand  with respect  to 
the relative price  of the two goods. 
Regarding  investment demand, we assume an assymetric  structure. 
In the creditor country,  there exists a linear  technology  that 
transforms  investment  into output  dX/dI = 1+r,  r  being  a technological 
constant.18  Therefore,  in the creditor country,  investment  is the 
21 variable  that adjusts to support the savings/investment/current 
account  balance.  By contrast, in the debtor country,  investment  is 
determined  by the  economic  authority, as explained above. 
6.  Adjustment  to an Increase in Net Borrowing 
Given  the demand  and supply structure detailed  above, the 
equilibrium of  the system can be represented  in the following way.  In 
period one, with  the credit constraint binding,  consumption  in the 
debtor country cannot  exceed the exogenous limit 
QY1 +  B — 1*.  The 
domestic  interest rate adjusts to obtain that level of consumption. 
The distribution  of  consumption across goods  is given by (19)  and 
(20).  In the developed  economy, consumption is set according  to the 
level of  wealth  but, given  the exogeneity of B, the investment level I 
has to adjust to satisfy the first-period budget constraint.  This is 
of no consequence, because of the linear technology.  Market—clearing 
in the first period is then  given by: 
+ B  - 
Iy)a(Q) 








-  B  - 
I](1.g(Q))  (24) 
In  the second  period, there  is effectively only  one  good, since 
supply can costlessly  accomodate any combination of X  and Y.  Then, 
there  is only an income/expenditure  equilibrium condition  in each 
country.  Given  the credit constraints, second period  consumption, 
which  is determined  according  to  the intertemporal conditions  (18)  and 
22 (21)  equals: 
+  — 
p(l+r)[QY1 
+ 8  - 
Iy(r*)J  (25) 
+  — 
p(l+r)[k1 
-  B  - ij 
(26) 
And consumption must  equal income in each country, which  is given 












R(Y2)  P(1+r)[X1 
-  B 
I] 
(28) 
Equilibrium can then  be represented by equations  (23), (or (24)), 
(27), and (28)  These equilibrium  conditions determine the  value  of 
the following endogenous variables: the first period  terms of trade, 
the interest rate in the developing  countries, and investment  in the 
* 
developed countries  (Q, r  ,  and I).  The levels of net borrowing  B, 
and of investment by the debtor  country 1* are exogenously determined 
in the debt  negotiation process. 
Suppose now  that  the developed  nations initiate a marginal 
increase in the available credit  (dB > 0),  and let us evaluate the 
normative  and positive  aspects of the adjustment to such an increase 
in lending.  The response  of the terms of trade to the increase in 
lending, evaluated  at Q  1, is equal to:19 
{(lh 
dI+dI*  + 
(1a)h(l)] 
(29) 
23 with  c2 = 
ahY1  h(aE+ E1).  This  expression is positive  for 
values  of  that are in the Pareto region defined above curve  CC  (i.e. 
for ,6xm/(1+r)  > 1),  The change in investment  is given by: 
-  1  -  (-1  (30) 
dB  l+ 
Consider  the case of a =  1.20  The homothesticity  of utilities 
and  the absence of a local habitat effect imply that wealth increases 
or  welath  redistributions  will not affect  the relative  price Q 
Therefore,  the change in investment in the two countries will 
detennine  the change in tenns of trade,  From (30)  it can be seen 
*  that the change in I  is given  by ,  while the change in I is a 
one—for—one  fall with the increases in lending and in consumption, 
where the latter is proportional  to the change in wealth  in the 
creditor  country: —l + 
Note  that (30)  implies that, when  xTn/(l+r) = I  (which defines 
curve  CC,  i.e. the lower bound  of contracts acceptable to the creditor 
when  terms of trade do not change), for  =  1 there is no change  in 
aggregate  investment and thus in Q, for  < 1 aggregate investment  and 
Q  fall, and for  fi  > 1,  aggregate  investment and Q increase,  This 
means  that only when investment in the debtor country  increases more 
than one for one with  increases in borrowing  will terms of trade  turn 
in favor of the creditor country. 
We  cam now  use (14),  (15),  and (29)  to  determine  the region of 
Pareto—improving  contracts.  The new boundary  for the creditor country 
is defined  by: 
24 1  +  +  (la)h) 
(31) 
Y (1-h)  Y 
xm 
I  1  i  1 
—i-;— 
- 
cl(l+p)  J 
+  (1-h)  + (1-a)h 
This means  that with  imperfect substitutability  (Q < C.'),  the 
curve CC rotates to a position like C'C'  (see Figure 2).  For  values  of 
< 1, the  terms  of trade  move  in favor of the debtor economy,  and 
this fact excludes  some contracts that would  be beneficial without  the 
relative price change.  Note that, for  < 1,  there is now  a  region 
(labeled region  A) of contracts that are profitable  for banks (whose 
relevant cut-off continues to be still CC), but not for the 
representative  consumer in the creditor  country.  At fi  = 1  the two 
curves overlap  because,  as can be seen from  (29),  there would be no 
change in terms of trade.  For values  of fi >  1,  the terms of trade 
change in favor of the  developed  economy, and a typical consumer  in 
the developed  economy would benefit  from contracts  that are not 
acceptable to banks, such as those in region  B.21 
Therefore,  accounting for imperfect substitutability  between 
goods produced  by different  countries changes the conditions under 
which  a  beneficial  increase in lending may exist and  creates a 
divergence  of opinion  between international banks  and a  representative 
consumer  in the creditor country.  In the context of the present 
model, this divergence  of opinion can be summarized  in the following 
way: for contracts  with flsofterlt  investment conditionality  (  < 1), 
banks are more  likely to find opportunities  for increased  lending, but 
the creditor  country will find convenient contracts  with "harder" 
investment conditionality  (  > 1)  and smaller  repayment  (x)  that 
actually produce  losses to creditor banks. 
25 7.  An Alternative  Framework 
22 
The model above assumed that debtors and creditors negotiate  over 
the addition  to investment  () and  to repayment  (x) that  should be 
attached to an increase  in lending.  Such  framework appears to be in 
line with observed  behavior  in the recent rescheduling negotiations. 
Often  in those  negotiations,  some conditionality  on  the debtor 
country's policies——usually  within the framework of a  Fund-supported 
program——is part  of the agreement.  In the model this policy 
conditionality  is represented as a  certain value for the composition 
of spending, that is, the  value  of the parameter . In addition, 
negotiations determine  how  much  is paid  and how much is rescheduled, a 
decision that is highly  dependent on  the economic performance  of the 
debtor.  In  the  model,  this is represented by the parameter  x• 
It can be argued, however, that negotiating  over (8,) is not the 
best  policy for the creditor.  The creditor  could leave the investment 
decision  entirely up  to the debtor, which  (in  the absence  of 
distortions  in the debtor  economy) would maximize  second—period  output 
if the  proper  incentives are in place.  In order to provide  such 
proper  incentives, repayment  should be agreed as a  fixed amount, 
because then  the debtor  can keep the return to any increase  in 
investment that it achieves.23 
The alternative  framework for negotiations would  therefore  not 
attach  policy conditionality  to the increased lending.  In the absence 
of domestic distortions,  investment  in the  debtor  economy  would 
therefore  be determined  by equating  the  marginal  product  of capital to 
26 the domestic  interest rate r*.  The new contract being  negotiated 
would simply determine the marginal  repayment that will follow the 
increase  in lending, which we  will denominate Z That is,  Z is 
defined by: 
Z  —  (32) 
d8 
The equilibrium of this  system is essentially  the same as the one 
above.  It is still represented by equations  (23), (27), and (28),  but 
now the effect of an increase in lending has to consider  (32)  and that 
investment  in the debtor economy will be given  by: 
dY2  * 
s  l--r  (33) 
dl 
-  <0  (34) 
where m  m(I*)  The effect on terms  of trade of an increase in 
lending can now be computed: 






l-ah  * - 
—  cr  +  —i-- p(l+r  )Y1  >  0 
(l+r*)(l+p)  -  <  0 
27 and n is as defined under  equation  (29).  It can be shown that  is 
positive  for all relevant values of a. 
The region  of Pareto—improving  contracts can now  be  determined. 
This region only refers to values  of Z.  If there are no changes in 
terms of trade, it is clear  that the creditors would  not accept any 
contract  unless  it sets Z > l+r,  and debtors would not accept any 
contract  unless it sets Z < l+r*.  As before, r* > r is the necessary 
condition  for the existence of a non—empty Pareto—improving  region. 
In Figure 3 we plot  the region of  Pareto—improving  contracts  as a 
function of a, which  represents the degree of substitutability  between 
the two goods.  In the limit, as a  goes to infinity and the two goods 
are perfect substitutes,  there is no terms of trade effect, and the 
Pareto region is as described  above.  In contrast,  for finite values 
of a, creditor  countries require a  value of Z exceeding  l+r to engage 
in further lending, and debtor countries accept a value of Z higher 
* 
than  l+r ,  because the terms of trade effect benefits the debtor 
country. 
These results qualify  the conclusions from the previous 
framework, in the sense that if investment is done in an optimal 
manner in the debtor country and debt negotiations provide  the correct 
incentives to achieve such investment, there are no  contracts  that the 
creditor  country would  be willing to engage in that  would  not be 
achieved  by a decentralized  banking system.  But, in addition, there 
is a set of contracts under  which  the decentralized  banking system 
would  engage in further borrowing that are not optimal from the  point 
of  view  of the representative  consumer in the creditor economy. 
Ultimately, the relevance of this and  the  previous  framework depends 
on an explicit account of the reasons for credit rationing  and 
28 under—investment.  We suspect that the existence of defensive  lending, 
different  time horizons between governments and the private  sector, 
distorted  capital markets, and asymmetric  information make  the 
conclusions of the former framework the more  relevant ones. 
IV.  Concluding Remarks 
This paper  studied the conditions under  which  renewed lending  to 
heavily—indebted  countries could be advantageous  for both creditor  and 
debtor  countries.  In dealing  with  the debt overhang  issue it is 
usefui to distinguish between tne redistributive  versus the efficiency 
issues.  The purpose of our analysis was to highlight  the potential 
efficiency  losses emerging  from the drop in investment  in the 
developing  countries due to the presence of credit rationing,  and to 
investigate mechanisms to revitalize tne investment process.  The 
analysis focused on the case where there are two dimensions  for the 
conditionality:  the determination  of the marginal propensity  to 
invest out of the new funds and of the marginal  propensity to repay 
out of future output.  We demonstrated the potential  trade of  f between 
these two dimensions  and pointed out that endogenous  terms of trade 
adjustment gives greater weight to investment conditionality.  We now 
close the paper  with  some interpretive comments  regarding 
qualifications  and extensions. 
Our discussion  demonstrated that  (in the absence of strict 
investment conditionality)  renewed  lending to developing countries 
tends to  be associated with  an improvement  in the  terms  of trade of 
the developing  countries and  vice  versa.  This is consistent with the 
29 terms of trade deterioration  observed  in recent years.  In the 
eighties, there was a switch from a regime that transferred resources 
to the developing countries to a  regime that  transfers resources  from 
the developing  countries.  The importance of  the terms of trade 
adjustment stems from the observation that it has first-order welfare 
effects on the consumers  in the creditor and debtor nations, despite 
the fact that it is not internalized by the private banking  system. 
There are some qualifications  to our results in this  paper.  The 
framework developed  in the  paper  considers debt  and credit rationing 
at the global level.  Even if each indebted country  has limited market 
power in its products,  the group of indebted countries as a whole  has 
significant market power.  Because most indebted countries are facing 
presently  similar constraints, we have used  an aggregate version of a 
two-block world--creditors  and debtors.  However,  if it is only  the 
collective response of debtor countries that  is large enough to 
produce terms of trade  changes, individual debtor  countries would  not 
be willing  to accept a less favorable contract  in consideration  of the 
terms of trade effect.  If this is the case, the set of contracts 
acceptable to debtors is not changed by  the existence of a terms of 
trade effect of increased lending.  Another  qualification  is that  it 
is not entirely clear  that the decisions of economic authorities  are 
consistent with the representative consumer's  interest when it comes 
to issues such as terms  of trade changes.  It appears that the 
protection  of import-competing  industries in industrial countries may 
be,  in fact, more  important for the authorities. 
This  last point suggests an interesting extension to the present 
framework.  Some consistency  is required between  the conditionality 
attached to renewed  credit  and commercial policies  adopted in the two 
30 blocks of countries, particularly  in the creditor countries.  Even in 
the absence of renewed lending, repayment of past  loans will require 
Consistent  commercial policy  (i.e., intensive application  of quotas 
may defeat any sincere  attempt for debt repayment).  This  suggests 
that the incorporation  of commercial policy actions to the  policies 
considered  in the debt negotiation process could have important 
implications for the design  of mutually advantageous debt contracts. 
31 APPENDIX 
Some Derivations 
This  appendix  provides the details of the derivation  of two 
expressions used  in the main body of the paper.  The first expression 
concerns the effects  of increased lending on utility.  Differentiating 
the utility functions  (7) and (8) we obtain: 
*  *  * 
dtJ*  *  *1y  *  *  U2y 
+  dY  '  ÷  p '  + 
dY2 p  (al) 
ulx  01X  lx  uix 
U  U  -  U 
—  dx  +  dx  ,v  +  dX  p  +  dY  p  (a2) 
1  1  2  2 
We assume  that marginal  rates of substitution  are given by the 
standard  optimality  conditions: 
* 
U1Y  -  1,Y  =  (a3) 
UlX  1,X 
*  * 
U2x  2Y  1 
*'  =  c'  ' 
—  *  (a4) 
1+0 
u2x  U2Y  1 
p  =  p  =  (aS)  1+0 
Making  use of these marginal rates of substitution,  we obtain: 
32 * 
dU  *  *  1  *  * 
dX  +  QdY1 
+  + dY)  (a6) 
1+r 
dX1  QdY1 
÷  dX2 ÷ dY2)  (a7) 
Differentiating  the budget constraint  (3),  we obtain: 
*  *  - 
Y  -R)  *  *  *  *  *  2  2  * 




f  2 
+ dY)  2  dr 
1-fr  1+r 
Y1dQ + dB 
-  dl  + —— 
(dY2  dR)  (a8) 
1+r 
Note  that Y2+ X  = 
Y2— R,  because of the credit constraint, which 
means  that the change in the interest rate  in the developing nations 
*  (r )  does  not  generate a direct wealth effect.  In fact, neither  the 
domestic nor the foreign interest rate affect  wealth  of the debtor 
country.  This is a consequence of the credit rationing/insolvency 
situation.  Because of credit rationing,  the country as a whole does 
not have a net position  on assets carrying the domestic  interest rate 
*  r  ,  and because  of insolvency, repayments  R are not linked to interes' 
rates.  With "normal', fully—integrated capital markets, an increase 
in the world interest rate reduces the  borrower's  wealth by  the change 
in  the interest rate times  the external indebtedness position.  The 
credit rationing and insolvency situation truncates this channel, 
because  it de—links debt  service from the world  interest rate. 
Finally,  from  (a6) and (a8),  and making use of our assumptions 
regarding  marginal  investment and repayment rates in the debtor 
country,  we obtain  expression  (9) in the paper, and an entirely 
33 parallel procedure  applied to the  developed  economy  leads to equation 
(10) 
____ —  Y1-2  +l-fi+ (l-x)  (9) 
dB  dB  l+r 
-Y  -l+----  (10) 
dB  dE  l+r 
The second expression  this appendix is concerned with is the 
change in the tens  of trade generated by an increase in lending, 
dQ/dB.  We recall that the system  can be represented in the following 
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+ B  - iJ  (27) 
X2(I) + 
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-  B  - 
1] 
(28) 
These equilibrium  conditions detenine the value  of the following 
endogenous variables:  the first period  tens  of trade, the intereat 
rate in the developing  nations, and investment in the developed 
*  countries  (Q, r  ,  and I).  The levels of net borrowing  B, and of 
investment by the debtor  country 1* are exogenously  detenined in the 
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It can be seen that there is some recursivity  in the system, in 
*  tnat the variable  r  can be determined after the rest of the system  is 
solved.  The role of r* is only to ensure  that  spending  in the debtor 
economy,  E1 is equal to the resources avaiable  in the first period, 
and only  the level of  matters for the rest of the equilibrium. 
Collecting  terms in (all>  we obtain: 
dl 
-  xnifl  - p(1+r)  —  (a12) 
dB  (1+r)(1+p; 
Using (a12)  in (a9), we obtain: 
+ ah(E + 
E1)J 
-  (1-ah)(I-fl)  -  (1-h) + (1h))1  (a13) 
And some further transformations  produce equation  (29)  in the 
paper: 
-  1 [j  1 
-  1  -  (-1 +  + 
(ls)h(lfl)} 
(29) 
with  = 
ahY1 
+ ah(aE+ E1). 
35 Footnotes 
1  For an analysis  of country risk see for example, Harberger  (1976), 
Kharas  (1981), Eaton and  Gersovitz  (1981), Sachs  (1984), Kletzer 
(1984)  ,  Cohen  and  Sachs  (1985)  ,  Dornbusch  (1985)  ,  Krugman  (1985) 
Smith and Cuddington  (1985), Edwards  (1985), Folkerts-Landau  (1985), 
Dooley  (1986), Aizenman  (1986), Bulow and Rogoff  (1986)  ,  Aizenman 
(1987), Helpman  (1987), and Borensztein and Ghosh  (1988). 
2  The  literature on "solutions" to the debt situation  is also quite 
impressive.  Important studies that summarize advantages and 
disadvantages  of existing proposals  include: Krugman  (1985), Dornbusch 
(1987), Fischer  (1987),  Feldstein at al  (1987),  and Bergsten  et al 
(1985) 
3  That  is,  as much  as it is necessary to equate the domestic  interest 
rate to the international  rate. 
4  The link between  real commodity prices  and debt service is 
suggested in Feldstein et al (1987). 
5  An extensive analysis of this market  structure in the context  of 
international trade  can be found in Helpman and Erugman  (1985). 
6  Alternatively,  the differentiation  could arise from reputational or 
learning problems. 
7  This range is taken from the survey included in Marquez  and 
McNeilly  (1987) 
8  The estimates  reported by Khan and Knight (1988) also lie between  1 
and 2. 
36 9  This would  be consistent with an environment where there exists a 
technology  in period two that costlessly transforms good  Y into good X 
at a fixed rate  (say one)  .  The existence  of credit rationing would 
prevent the exploitation  of arbitrage opportunities.  The assumption 
is also  consistent with  the idea that the second period  represents a 
long—run position  in the context  of constant returns to scale and 
perfect competition. 
10  We abstract  from monitoring problems, assuming  that contract 
conditions are perfectly  enforceable. 
11  Note  that the consequence of credit rationing  is 'under—investment' 
in the developing  nations relative to the first best.  The distortion 
wedge is measured  by the interest rate  differential.  The change in 
welfare  is the result of multiplying the distortion  by the change in 
the distorted  activity. 
* 
12  In fact, this requires  (l-x)m/(l±r )  <  1,  which  we assume to hold 
*  in the relevant  range.  It will always hold  if, for example, m  = l±r 
13  But contracts with  (,x)  outside the unit square are also possible, 
and some of them  benefit the debtor country. 
14  This analysis  is not fully correct because dQ/dB  will  itself depend 
on the parameters  $ and x. 
15  An example of a utility  function that generates  this type of demand 
function is: 
xl__  yl_Y 
U(X1,Y1,X2,Y2)  = 
ln[_I_ 
+  + in[_1 
+  1-7 
} 
37 16  The  case  of a =  1 corresponds to the case where there  is no 'local 
habitat', and the demand  functions are the same in both  countries. The 
case of a < I corresponds to the case where each country  prefers  its 
own good. 
17  We assume that the range of values of Q  is such that  hg(Q) < 1 
always. 
18  This linear technology  serves the purpose of isolating 
intertemporal marginal  rates of substitution in the developed  economy 
from feedback from international  lending to the  developing  world, 
Our analysis can be extended  to the case where  r is endogenously 
determined, without  affecting the logic of our  discussion. 
19  The derivation  is contained  in the Appendix. 
20  Note  that, for  a < I, in the absence of new investment we get an 
improvement  in the  terms  of trade of developing countries  due to the 
"local habitat"  effect.  This is in line with the  classical  transfer 
criterion  (for analysis using  transfer considerations  see Frenkel and 
Razin (1987) and  van  Wijnbergen  (1988)).  Note  also that, with  a 
unitary marginal  investment (  = 1),  the terms of trade  adjustment  is 
independent of any local habitat  effect. 
21  The closer  substitutes goods X and Y are, the smaller the terms  of 
trade  change  that would  occur, and the smaller  the shift in the CC 
curve.  This can be seen  from equation  (32), where  the elasticity of 
substitution  is positivaly  associated with  c.  Also, the larger the 
local habitat  effect (smaller a) the larger the impact of the terms of 
trade change on the Pareto region (i.e. the larger  the shift in Cc). 
38 22  We thank  Elhanan  Helpman and Assaf Razin  for coirurtents that led to 
this section. 
23  In fact, the optimal policy  for the creditor  is dependent  on the 
nature of uncertainty  in the model, and on the  Possible  existence of 
asymmetric  information, as the results in Krugman (1987) and Froot, 
Sharfstein and Stein (1988) show. 
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Chart 1.  Industrial Production  and Real Commodity Pricest' 
Real Commodity Prices 
1/ Industrial  production in industrial  coutries and prices of non—oil 
commodities  exported by developing countries deflated by pricea of 
manufactures exported by industrial  countries. 
Source:  IMP,  International Financial Statistics. 
i0 
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1977  1979  1921  1983  1955 Table 1.  Fifteen HeavIly Indebted Countries 
Non—Interest 
Terms of Trade  Export Volume  Current Account  1/ 
1981  100.0  100.0  —2.1  2/ 
1982  95.9  97.4  2.8 
1983  92.5  100.2  31.5 
1984  94.8  110,2  51.7 
1985  92.9  112.4  50.7 
1986  78.5  109.6  29.6 
1987  77.5  107.5  31.0 
Source:  InternatIonal  Monetary Fund, World EconomIc Outlook. 
1/  Curre  t  account, excluding Investment Incorue other than dIrect 
Investment, in bIllIons of dollars. 











1981  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
1982  121.7  75.7  77.3  86.3 
1983  137.2  69.0  72.5  87.2 
1984  133.0  73.2  79.4  92.3 
1985  148,7  60.1  64.4  76.4 
1986  176.1  64.2  58.3  .,. 
Cumulative 
Change  81—86 
76.1  —35.8  —41.7  —23.6 
Source:  Banco Central de  Chile, Boletln Mensual and Indlcadores 
de  Comercio Exterior. 
!/  In  current US$. 
2/  Relative to Index of Industrial CountrIes Manufactures export 
prices (IMP:  World Economic Outlook). 
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